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In the first decade of this century, a central preoccupation of American 
foreign policy has been the rise of international terrorism.1  This 
phenomenon provokes questions about the interrelation of international and 
domestic criminal law, constitutional interpretation, intelligence gathering, 
and military strategy.  Now, after the challenges of the last eight years, the 
rhetoric (if not yet the reality) of American policy on terrorism seems to be 
changing.2  The attempt to transfer prosecution from military tribunals to 
Article III courts is exemplary of this overall shift.  But there are deeper 
legal issues at play beyond the political repercussions of this shift.3  A 
recent line of cases from the Supreme Court has the potential to make the 
process of trying suspected terrorists more complicated than it need be.4  
Crawford v. Washington and its progeny have articulated a new standard 
for Confrontation Clause analysis and in so doing have raised significant 
questions about the future admissibility of certain evidence in criminal 
trials.5
 
* Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., Wesleyan 
University, 2006. 
 
1 See David M. Edelstein & Ronald R. Krebs, Think Again: Barack Obama and the War 
on Terror, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan. 19, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/01/18/ 
think_again_barack_obama_and_the_war_on_terror. 
2 Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civilian Court in New 
York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.  But see Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. 
Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New York City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A1.  
3 Scott Shane, Site for Terror Trial Isn’t Its Only Obstacle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at 
A18.  
4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
5 Joshua L. Dratel, The Impact of Crawford v. Washington on Terrorism Prosecutions, 
CHAMPION, Sept. 2004, at 19; Savage, supra note 2.  
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The goal of this Comment6
II. BACKGROUND 
 is to analyze the new confrontation rule 
from Crawford to determine what types of challenges its more rigorous 
testimonial evidence standard poses for prosecutors in future terrorism 
cases.  Subpart II.A will provide background on the relevant cases, 
discussing the Court’s holding in Crawford as well as its subsequent 
clarification in Davis v. Washington.  Subpart II.B will describe the two 
primary federal regulations governing specific rules applicable to the use of 
foreign intelligence at trial.  Part III will argue that the new Confrontation 
Clause standard potentially conflicts with these federal regulations and 
analyze the costs this conflict could impose on the government.  Lastly, Part 
IV will attempt to weigh the merits of potential solutions and assess the 
likelihood of their adoption. 
A. CRAWFORD: CHANGING THE RULES 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him . . . .”7  The common law developed a 
general antipathy towards the introduction of hearsay evidence and it is 
thought the Confrontation Clause embodies the same general principle.8  
The common law also disfavors reliance upon ex parte testimony presented 
through affidavits.9
 
6 The goal of this Comment is not to promote the introduction of unreliable hearsay 
evidence against foreign defendants at trial.  Rather, both the new Crawford rule and the new 
FISA warrant standard are problematic and should be reassessed because they impose 
significant costs on prosecution and these costs may discourage the Government from 
bringing charges in criminal courts against suspected terrorists.  The assumption is that 
prosecutions of foreign terrorists are going to continue in one forum or another (be it 
military, criminal, or “other”).  This Comment starts from the presumption that Article III 
courts are preferable, and for this reason the legal community should be cognizant of 
instances where (perhaps unintended) intersections of rules potentially throw up road blocks 
to the introduction of otherwise reliable evidence. 
  Defendants have the right to compel witnesses against 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
8 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S 74, 86 (1970) (stating that the Confrontation Clause and 
hearsay rules stem from the same roots but are not the same thing); California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 155 (1970); see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 475, 501 (2006). 
9 The holdings in both Crawford and Davis rely heavily upon examples of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth century prosecutions by ex parte affidavit as justification for the “testimonial 
hearsay” rule.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–46, 50–51.  In 
particular, they focus on the case of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason on the 
basis of untested, ex parte affidavits.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 828; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  
This is the proper context within which to examine the Framers’ intentions with regards to 
confrontation.  Daniel B. Shanes, Confronting Testimonial Hearsay: Understanding the New 
2011] “CONFRONTING” FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 1041 
them to appear and then to cross-examine those witnesses to test for 
weaknesses in their testimony.10
On its face, the Confrontation Clause seems to require a blanket 
prohibition of any statement made by a declarant not testifying at trial.
 
11  
Such a shallow reading, however, would abrogate centuries of common law 
precedent recognizing a variety of valid hearsay exceptions.12  Treating the 
words in the Confrontation Clause as a literal command would be far too 
extreme and out of line with the intentions of the Framers.13  Therefore, the 
challenge for the courts is to balance the constitutionally enshrined 
preference for face-to-face testimony in criminal trials and the right to 
cross-examine hostile witnesses with the workaday realities of a functioning 
criminal justice system.14
In 1980, the Supreme Court set out a test for evidence challenged 
under the Confrontation Clause that attempted to strike just such a 
balance.
 
15  The Court determined in Ohio v. Roberts that the Sixth 
Amendment guaranteed a substantive right to challenge the reliability of 
evidence at trial.16  The defendant in this case was charged with forgery.17  
At a preliminary hearing, the defense attorney called the daughter of the 
victim and attempted in vain to get her to admit to authorizing the 
defendant’s use of the checks and credit cards in question.18  At trial, the 
defendant took the stand and testified that the daughter had in fact 
authorized him to use those checks and cards.19  Between the deposition and 
the trial, the daughter had run away from home and her whereabouts were 
unknown.20  Consequently, the prosecutor sought to introduce her testimony 
from the preliminary hearing to rebut the respondent’s statements.21
 
Confrontation Clause, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 879, 880–81 (2009); see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
54; cf. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1994). 
  This 
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
11 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 
237, 243 (1895). 
12 See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 80 (“It is not argued, nor could it be, that the constitutional 
right to confrontation requires that no hearsay evidence can ever be introduced.”). 
13 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. 
14 Id. at 66. 
15 Id. at 56. 
16 Brian McEvoy, Note, Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause: Correcting a 
Misapplication of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 395, 399 
n.26 (2005); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
17 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 59. 
20 Id. at 59–60. 
21 Id. at 59. 
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evidence was admitted, the transcript was read to the jury, and the 
defendant was convicted.22  The conviction, however, was overturned on 
appeal.23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court.
 
24  The Court held that the testimony at 
the preliminary hearing was admissible under the Confrontation Clause 
because it bore “sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ and afforded the ‘trier-of-
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’”25  
In prior cases the Court had recognized that certain hearsay exceptions “rest 
upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within 
them comports with the ‘substance of the constitutional protection.’”26  
These holdings supported the principle that even if certain evidence is not 
tested through cross-examination at trial, it is nevertheless constitutionally 
“safe” because it has either been tested prior to trial, or the surrounding 
circumstances indicate that the trier-of-fact can trust the evidence.27  These 
exceptions are “firmly rooted” as they have been examined and tested by 
the courts over time, and ensure as “strict an adherence to the truth as would 




23 Id. at 60; see also State v. Roberts, 378 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ohio 1978) (holding that the 
testimony at issue did not fall within a recognized hearsay exception and thus violated the 
defendant’s confrontation right).  The Ohio Supreme Court held that here the hearsay 
exception for prior testimony of an unavailable witness was not properly invoked because 
the purpose of the prior hearing was not sufficiently related to the subsequent trial.  Id. 
24 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56. 
25 Id. at 73 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972)). 
26 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).  In 
footnote 8 of the opinion, the Court specifically identifies certain types of hearsay exceptions 
that have been so classified.  Id. at 66 n.8.  See Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 215–16 (cross 
examined prior-trial testimony); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (same); Mattox, 
156 U.S. at 244 (dying declaration).  Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court in Roberts, also 
states “the business and public records exceptions would seem to be among the safest of the 
hearsay exceptions.”  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (quoting J. Broocks Greer, III, Comment, 
Hearsay, the Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668 
(1970)). 
27 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 (holding that statements of an unavailable witness were 
admissible because the testimony had been tested by cross examination at a prior hearing); 
see also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88–89 (1970); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
28 Or cross-examination at trial.  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) (quoting 
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
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1. The Crawford Revolution 
Until 2004, the holding in Roberts was recognized as the proper 
approach to the problem of reconciling hearsay exceptions with the 
Confrontation Clause.29  Courts evaluated the “reliability” of disputed 
evidence and gave significant weight to exceptions cataloged in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.30  In 2004, however, the Court announced a radical 
departure from this established process.31  It abandoned the case-by-case 
analysis of Roberts, for (at least on the surface) a more dogmatic analysis of 
the “testimonial/non-testimonial” character of the evidence.32  According to 
the majority in Crawford v. Washington, the Roberts Court had its Sixth 
Amendment analysis wrong: the Confrontation Clause is a procedural 
guarantee, not a substantive one.33
In August 1999, Michael Crawford was arrested for murder.
  And as a procedural right, it does not 
bow to competing policy interests or notions of judicial efficiency. 
34  
Crawford was accused of stabbing Kenneth Lee in Lee’s apartment after 
Lee allegedly attempted to rape Crawford’s wife.35  Crawford claimed at 
trial that he had gone to the victim’s apartment to confront him about this, 
and while he was there a fight broke out.36  Crawford claimed that during 
this fight he stabbed Lee in self-defense.37
This version of events conflicted with a statement made by Crawford’s 




29 See id. at 124–25; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990); Bourjaily v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 392 (1986). 
  Crawford’s wife did not 
testify at trial, but the prosecution introduced the tape recording under the 
30 See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124–25; Wright, 497 U.S. at 814; Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 182; 
Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392.  
31 Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the “Ongoing Emergency”: A Pragmatic Approach to 
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 731 
(2008) (“In 2004, after nearly twenty-four years of this well-entrenched reliability approach, 
the Supreme Court substantially altered the course of the Confrontation Clause analysis with 
its pathbreaking decision in Crawford v. Washington.”) (emphasis added); Richard D. 
Friedman, Crawford, Davis, and Way Beyond, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 553, 554 (2007) (“Crawford 
v. Washington changed the landscape dramatically.”); Jennifer B. Sokoler, Between 
Substance and Procedure: A Role for States’ Interests in the Scope of the Confrontation 
Clause, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 170 (2010) (“In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court upended close to a quarter century’s worth of jurisprudence . . . .”); see also Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004). 
32 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see McEvoy, supra note 16, at 398. 
33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.  




38 Id. at 39. 
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statement-against-interest hearsay exception.39  After being convicted, 
Crawford challenged the admission of the tape.  The Washington Supreme 
Court upheld his conviction, concluding that: “although [Crawford’s wife’s] 
statement did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore 
guarantees of trustworthiness.”40
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Washington 
Supreme Court.  While the Roberts Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause provides a substantive right to reliable evidence, Justice Scalia 
stated that the Clause is primarily concerned with ensuring direct, face-to-
face confrontation at trial.
 
41
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia took a long view of history 
and drew on sources dating as far back as the Roman Empire.
 
42  In 
particular, he focused his attention on one specific incident: the trial, and 
subsequent execution, of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603 for treason.43  In that 
trial, the Crown relied primarily on the accusations of Lord Cobham, 
Raleigh’s supposed co-conspirator.44  Cobham made a statement accusing 
Raleigh of treason to the Privy Council prior to trial as well as in a separate 
letter.45  While Cobham did not testify at trial, both of these records were 
read to the jury.46  Raleigh argued that these statements were coerced, but 
his entreaties to bring Cobham before the jury for cross-examination were 
ignored.47
The fallout of the Raleigh “show trial” influenced both British and 
American jurisprudence by solidifying the importance of confrontation and 
cross-examination.
 
48  The Crawford opinion highlights how attempts by the 
Government to introduce untested ex parte evidence were met with 
resistance in both England and the Colonies.49
 
39 See WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (2003).  She admitted in the statement that she led 
Crawford to Lee’s apartment and thus facilitated the assault.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.  
Crawford’s wife did not testify at trial because her testimony was subject to the spousal 
privilege under the Washington Rules of Evidence.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(1) 
(1994).  
  Moreover, the primacy of 
40 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41 (citing State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 (Wash. 2002)). 
41 Id. at 57. 
42 Id. at 43. 





48 Id. at 50. 
49 See, e.g., King v. Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696) (holding that in a misdemeanor 
libel case, the statement of a dead witness could not be introduced because the defendant did 
not have a chance to cross examine); Lord Fenwick’s Case, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 
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face-to-face confrontation was recognized even after the drafting of the 
Constitution.50  Justice Scalia cited opinions from the early years of the 
American republic in which the requirement of face-to-face confrontation 
and cross-examination continued to be “uncompromising.”51
The Crawford Court specifically rejected the Roberts reliability test.  
In its place, the Court stated that any testimonial evidence not testified to at 
trial will be excluded, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had previously cross-examined the testimony.
 
52  According to Justice 
Scalia, under the Roberts regime, courts had lost sight of this important 
principle of trial procedure.53  The central holding of Crawford is that 
admission into evidence of a tape-recorded witness statement to police 
officers violates the Constitution’s uncompromising mandate.54  According 
to Justice Scalia, the Confrontation Clause excludes all testimonial hearsay 
evidence.55  In this new regime, there is no room for an inquiry into 
reliability.  The Court went so far as to ridicule such a standard, remarking 
that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously 
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty.”56
What Crawford lacks, however, is a specific definition of what 
“testimonial evidence” really means.  The Court defended its incomplete 
description by arguing that the opinion need only focus on the core or 
“nucleus” of the Clause.
 
57  As the statements at issue in Crawford fit well 
within this core, the Court needed to opine no further.58
 
591–92 (H.C.) (“[N]o deposition of a person can be read, though beyond sea, unless in cases 
where the party is to be read against was privy to the examination, and might have cross 
examined him . . . .”).  In the early eighteenth century, the Virginia Council protested 
untested ex parte evidence after governors privately issued several commissions to examine 
witnesses against particular men ex parte.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47. 
  Yet even the extent 
of this core is not clearly defined.  At times the Court’s logic implies that 
the subjective intent of the declarant is primary in determining the scope of 
50 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49. 
51 Id. (citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794) and State v. Campbell, 30 
S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124 (S.C. Ct. App. 1844)).  
52 Id. at 53–54. 
53 Id. at 60 (“Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the 
original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.”). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 61 (“[The Court imposes] an absolute bar to statements that are testimonial, 
absent a prior opportunity to cross-examine . . . .”). 
56 Id. at 62. 
57 Id. at 51–52. 
58 Id. 
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“testimony.”59  Bearing testimony against a person requires that the 
“bearer” intend to expose the person to some liability.60  At other times the 
Court articulated that the test is whether the “objective” witness would 
reasonably understand that the testimony would later be available at trial.61
2. Davis and Hammon: The Purpose of the Inquiry. 
  
Given the ambiguity of the holding, it took only two years for the Court to 
again take up this issue and attempt to clarify the expanse of “testimony.” 
In 2006, the Court took the opportunity to further elaborate on its 
initial definition of testimony announced in Crawford.  The Court in Davis 
v. Washington contrasted the factual settings of two cases to articulate a 
more exact definition of “testimonial” evidence.62  Both fact patterns deal 
with police response to reports of domestic violence.  In the first situation 
the primary purpose of the inquiry eliciting the testimony was to properly 
respond to an “ongoing emergency.”63  In the second, the primary purpose 
was to collect evidence for trial.64
The facts in Davis are as follows: a victim of domestic violence placed 
a call to a 911 operator.
 
65  She told the operator that her boyfriend was in 
the process of assaulting her.66  In the course of the conversation, the 
operator determined that the boyfriend’s name was Adrian Davis.67  Later 
in the call, the victim reported that Davis had run out of the house.68  The 
operator remained on the phone and collected more information on the 
boyfriend and the basis of the domestic dispute.69





59 Id. at 51 (“Testimony, in turn, is typically [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
  The prosecution attempted to introduce the transcript of the 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 52 (“[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
62 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  The two cases which were consolidated for this matter were: 
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) and Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 
2005). 
63 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817–18, 828. 
64 Id. at 819–20. 
65 Id. at 817. 
66 Id. at 817–18. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 818. 
70 Id. at 819. 
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911 conversation, however.71  The trial court admitted the transcript, 
determining that the statements were non-testimonial.72
The facts of the second case, Hammon v. Indiana, closely mirror those 
of Davis: the police responded to reports of domestic abuse at the home of 
Amy and Hershel Hammon.
 
73  When the police arrived at the house, Mrs. 
Hammon appeared frightened and there was evidence of a struggle.74  
Initially, however, she stated that “nothing was the matter.”75  Mr. Hammon 
likewise denied assaulting her.  Eventually, after separating Mr. Hammon 
from Mrs. Hammon, she admitted to one officer that her husband had 
thrown her to the ground and hit her.76  She then filled out a battery 
affidavit.77
The state charged Mr. Hammon with domestic battery.  Mrs. Hammon 
was subpoenaed, but did not appear.
 
78  The prosecutor called the officer 
who took the statement to testify to its substance.  The trial court 
determined that, under hearsay exceptions for present sense impression and 
excited utterance, the evidence was admissible.79
The Supreme Court determined that these two statements were 
distinguishable under the Confrontation Clause and held that: 
 
Statements are non-testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.80
The Court gave three reasons why statements made during the 911 call 
in Davis are different from statements made to the police in Hammon or 
Crawford.
 
81  First, while the Davis statements were made as the events 
were taking place, the Hammon and Crawford statements were made after 
the events in question.82
 
71 Id. 
  Second, the purpose of the 911 operator’s 
questions was to resolve the ongoing emergency, while the purpose of the 
72 Id. at 819. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 819–20. 
77 Id. at 820. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 822 (emphasis added). 
81 Id. at 827. 
82 Id. 
1048 JOHN SCOTT [Vol. 101 
police officers’ interrogation in both Hammon and Crawford was to 
investigate a past crime.83  Finally, the respective formalities of the 
statements were different.  The declarant in Crawford made her statement in 
a police station, responding calmly to direct police questions; the declarant 
in Davis was “frantic” and speaking from the scene of the alleged crime.84  
The Supreme Court concluded that the portions of the 911 transcript 
occurring prior to Davis fleeing the house were non-testimonial and 
admissible.85  The affidavit and statements at issue in Hammon were 
testimonial and therefore inadmissible.86
Much more recently, the Court has provided additional clarification of 
the “primary purpose” inquiry articulated in Davis.
 
87  In Michigan v. 
Bryant, the Court addressed the admissibility of a dying declaration by a 
shooting victim identifying the perpetrator.88  The Court held that a 
shooting suspect at large constituted an ongoing emergency and that 
statements elicited in an attempt to respond to that emergency were 
admissible under Crawford.89
B. TOOLS FOR TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 
   
Several years before the Court began to reevaluate the Confrontation 
Clause, Congress reevaluated and rearticulated the standards for gathering 
foreign intelligence.  As we will see below, these changes implicate one 
another. 
1. “Primary Purpose” in FISA 




  Under FISA, the government is permitted to 
conduct surveillance and searches in pursuit of foreign intelligence material 
without showing the normal probable cause to believe a crime had been 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 828–29. 
86 Id. at 828–30.  While the Court held that the 911 conversation was non-testimonial, it 
noted that this only applies to the part of the conversation that took place while the declarant 
was being attacked.  The later part, after Davis left the house, was not addressed, but it was 
hinted that it could be considered testimonial.  Id. at 828–29. 
87 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).  
88 Id.  In analyzing the objective circumstances of the statements, the Court applied the 
underlying logic of the traditional hearsay rules.  Id. at 1155. 
89 The Court’s analysis focused on the objective circumstances of the questioning, 
including the formality of the interaction and the actions of the officers.  Id. at 1160-61; see 
also id. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
90 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–85 (2006)). 
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committed.91  FISA was designed to fill the legal gaps left by Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.92  Both the Court and 
Congress had recognized the Executive Branch’s need to collect certain 
information in order to satisfy its constitutional duties.93  Additionally, in 
certain contexts this power could be exercised without invoking the 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment.94  Nevertheless, during the 
1960s and 1970s, past abuses of executive power, specifically with regards 
to wiretapping and information gathering, prompted a reevaluation of 
permissible government surveillance activities.95  FISA therefore set out the 
standards for collecting foreign intelligence both with and without a 
warrant.96
FISA covers both electronic surveillance and physical searches.
 
97
(1) Information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary 
to, the ability of the United States to protect against (A) actual or potential attack or 
  
Foreign intelligence information is that information which is: 
 
91 RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 77 (2008), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf. 
92 See Cedric Logan, The FISA Wall and Federal Investigations, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 209, 219 (2009); Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
269, 274 (2008).  FISA warrant procedures provide an alternative to Title III when federal 
agents are conducting electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence.  Logan, supra.  
Unlike Title III, which requires that agents identify the crime that has been or will be 
committed as well as the specific target of the surveillance, FISA requires that the target of 
surveillance be a foreign power and that the substance of the surveillance relate to the United 
State’s ability to protect against foreign aggression.  Id. at 219–20.  
93 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (1968); 
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 310 (1972).  
94 Keith, 407 U.S. at 303. 
95 The “Church Committee” (named after Chairman Sen. Frank Church) was established 
to “conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to 
intelligence activates and the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities 
were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government.”  CHURCH COMM. REPORTS, 
BOOK II INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at v 
(1976) (citing S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. § 1 (1975)).  The report highlighted decades of abusive 
targeting of different social groups by law enforcement acting under the auspices of 
“intelligence gathering.”  See id. at 8–10.  The Church Committee and the Watergate scandal 
indicated that without regulation and oversight, this power had significant potential to be 
abused.  See id. at 10. 
96 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006) (authorizing electronic surveillance without a court order); 
§ 1804 (defining the application process for court orders). 
97 Id. § 1802 (authorizing electronic surveillance); § 1822 (authorizing physical 
searches).  Physical searches were not covered until 1994.  See Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807, 108 Stat. 3423 (1994) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 50 U.S.C.). 
1050 JOHN SCOTT [Vol. 101 
other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) 
sabotage, international terrorism, or the international proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C) clandestine 
intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by 
an agent of a foreign power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign power or 
foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary 
to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (B) the conduct of 
the foreign affairs of the United States.98
In order to conduct surveillance the Attorney General may
 
99 apply to 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for a warrant.100  The 
court will grant an application if it finds there is probable cause to believe 
that the target is an agent of a foreign power and that a foreign power (or 
agent of a foreign power) controls the location at which the surveillance is 
to be conducted.101  The requirements for granting a FISA warrant are 
similar to but less rigorous than the standards under Title III.102  Whereas 
under Title III an applicant must show probable cause to believe that the 
surveillance will turn up evidence of a crime, under FISA the Government 
must only demonstrate probable cause that the subject of the surveillance is 
a foreign power or agent.103
In addition to information about the subject of the surveillance, the 
Government is required to show how they will comply with minimization 
procedures in order to prevent the gathering, retention, or dissemination of 
 
 
98 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e). 
99 The Attorney General is also authorized under FISA to conduct warrantless 
surveillance so long as it is directed at foreign powers.  Section 102 of the Act provides that 
“[t]he President, through the Attorney General, may authorize electronic surveillance 
without a court order under this [subchapter] to acquire foreign intelligence information for 
periods of up to one year . . . .”  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-511, § 102, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006)).  The 
Attorney General must certify, however, (1) that the surveillance is solely directed at 
communication exclusively between or among foreign powers, and (2) that there is no 
“substantial likelihood” that the surveillance will intercept communications of United States 
citizens.  50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A–B).  
100 An application must contain the following: (1) the identity of the target, (2) location 
where the surveillance is to be directed, (3) the type of communications sought to be 
acquired, and (4) the means by which the surveillance shall be conducted.  50 U.S.C. § 1804.  
101 Id. 
102 Blum, supra note 92, at 276. 
103 Id.  Under the warrant provision of FISA, an agent of a foreign power can include a 
United States citizen, provided that the basis for determining the probable cause that the 
citizen is an agent of a foreign power is not based solely on activities protected by the First 
Amendment.  50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3)(A).  
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nonpublic information.104  Determination of these minimization standards is 
left to the discretion of the Attorney General.105
As originally articulated in the statute, the “purpose” of a FISA 
investigation had to be the collection of foreign intelligence.
 
106  If evidence 
of criminal wrongdoing was discovered, however, this could still be 
introduced at trial so long as the requirements of the FISA statute relating to 
the identity of the target and the minimization procedures were met.107
Therefore, the scope of “purpose” was and still is significant.  The 
exact meaning of the term, however, evolved from the 1980s through the 
early 2000s.
 
108  Prior to the passage of FISA, the Fourth Circuit had 
analyzed the issue of the use of foreign intelligence information in court and 
articulated a standard.109  That court held in United States v. Troung Dinh 
Hung that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the primary purpose 
of an investigation is foreign intelligence gathering, and so information 
collected is admissible at a subsequent trial.110  The court dismissed the 
plaintiff’s argument that a sole purpose test should be adopted, as “almost 
all foreign intelligence investigations are in part criminal investigations.”111  
Adopting a sole purpose test would require the government to seek judicial 
warrants whenever it undertook foreign intelligence surveillance.112
 
104 Procedures must minimize use of “nonpublicly available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, 
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information . . . .”  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1), 
1806(a). The minimization procedures also must articulate how information can be shared 
between federal agents and agencies.  Id. § 1806. 
  This 
105 Id. §§ 1801(h), 1802(a)(1)(C).  Until 1995, the minimization standards were the 
“standard minimization procedures” generally utilized by the government when conducting 
electronic surveillance.  In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619 (FISA Ct. 2002).  Pursuant to these standards, after the 
information has been collected and processed into an intelligible form, a reviewing official 
makes a determination as to whether the information is, or “might be,” foreign intelligence.  
Information would only be “minimized” or discarded if it “could not be” foreign 
intelligence.  Id. at 618.  If it satisfied this very general standard it was logged and stored so 
as to allow later recovery and further analysis.  Id. 
106 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B).  
107 See generally id. § 1806(a–e). 
108 Diane Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the “Historical Mists”: The 
People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the “Wall,” 17 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 437, 452–53 (2006).  
109 United States v. Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980). 
110 Id. at 915; see also Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699 (2009) (explaining 
the exclusionary rule). 
111 Truong, 629 F.2d at 915. 
112 Id. at 916. 
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fails to acknowledge the government’s legitimate interest in conducting this 
type of surveillance.113
After FISA, other federal courts applied the holding in Truong to the 
new statute, and determined that the primary purpose of the investigation 
needed to be intelligence gathering.
 
114  In denying a defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence collected through a FISA warrant, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of New York cited Truong and stated “surveillance 
under FISA is appropriate only if foreign intelligence surveillance is the 
Government’s primary purpose.”115  In addition to the Second and Fourth 
Circuits, other courts from around the country weighed in on this issue and 
determined that, pursuant to Truong, “purpose” as articulated in FISA 
should be interpreted to mean “primary purpose.”116
While not addressed by the Supreme Court, this standard was adopted 
by the Justice Department (DOJ).
 
117  Under its FISA mandate to 
“minimize” misuse of information, DOJ regulated contact between its 
Criminal Division and the FBI to ensure that the “primary purpose” of its 
FISA warrants was not compromised.118  The official line, articulated in the 
1995 Protocols, was that when facts collected under FISA “reasonably 
indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or will be 
committed,” the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), in 
conjunction with the FBI, can notify the Criminal Division.119
 
113 Id. 
  Otherwise 
operations are kept separate.  In practice, these protocols built a “wall” 
between the various departments as the specific requirements attached to 
114 United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that primary 
purpose applies to FISA); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); 
see also United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the 
test but not deciding on its applicability). 
115 United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1189–90 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
116 Johnson, 952 F.2d, at 572 (First Circuit holding that primary purpose applies to 
FISA); see also Sarkissian, 841 F.2d at 964 (Ninth Circuit acknowledging the primary 
purpose test).  
117 Richard Scruggs, head of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) in 
1993, believed that the primary purpose standard was controlling on FISA.  Piette & Radack, 
supra note 108, at 471–72.  This position was first articulated in a memo by Assistant 
Attorney General Jamie Gorelick.  Letter from Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, 
to Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., et al. (1995), available at 
http://old.nationalreview.com/document/document_1995_gorelick_memo.pdf [hereinafter 
Gorelick Memo].  In July 1995, the procedures suggested by Scruggs and Gorelick came into 
effect.  Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States (July 19, 
1995), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html [hereinafter 1995 
Protocols]. 
118 1995 Protocols, supra note 117, at (A)1–2. 
119 Id. at A(1). 
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information transfer became so complex that sharing during the late 1990s 
simply was not done.120
The guidelines adopted in 1995 assured that “FISA information could 
almost never be shared with criminal investigators.”
 
121
Following the September 11 attacks, the government tried to determine 
what failures or oversights prevented the plot from being uncovered and the 
perpetrators stopped.
  Adopting the 
primary purpose standard encouraged thinking critically about the 
involvement of criminal investigators in FISA investigations, but erecting a 
wall was, in hindsight, an overreaction.  The consequence of this 
overreaction became clear in September 2001. 
122  Soon it became clear that restrictions on 
information sharing imposed within the DOJ had seriously hindered the 
ability of the government to track and respond to the threat.123  In October 
2001, Congress passed the United and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (PATRIOT Act).124  This collection of legislation covered a wide 
array of areas: it increased the emergency surveillance period from twenty-
four to seventy-two hours, expanded the use of electronic and physical 
searches, and extended surveillance periods from 90 to 120 days.125
Arguably the most significant change brought about by the PATRIOT 
Act, however, was the addition of a single word to 50 U.S.C. § 1804.  This 
statute governed applications for warrants from the FISC.
 
126  The 
PATRIOT Act added the word “significant” immediately before the word 
“purpose.”127  In doing so, Congress effectively knocked out the foundation 
of the wall that had been built within the DOJ.128
 
120 Blum, supra note 
  The courts could now 
92, at 281.  This does not mean it was impossible.  Some contact 
continued: information gathered under a FISA warrant could pass between the FBI and the 
Criminal Division if it was determined to relate to a “significant federal crime.”  1995 
Protocols, supra note 117, at A(1).  The Criminal Division could also provide “advice” in 
intelligence operations to better preserve the option of later criminal prosecution.  Id. at 
A(6). 
121 Blum, supra note 92, at 281 (quoting JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN 
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 81 (2006)).  
122 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION 
REPORT (2004).  
123 Id. 
124 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
125 Blum, supra note 92, at 280. 
126 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B) (2006); Blum, supra note 92, at 281–82; see also William 
C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1267 (2007).  
127 § 218, 115 Stat. at 291. 
128 Id. 
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issue FISA warrants in investigations where the primary purpose was not 
foreign intelligence gathering.129  Requiring only that intelligence gathering 
be a “significant purpose” implies that agents can use FISA’s secret and 
more permissive procedures when their primary purpose was to gather 
evidence for criminal prosecution.130
By early 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft had revoked Reno’s 
1995 procedures and instituted a new set of minimization procedures.
 
131  
According to Ashcroft, “[t]he USA Patriot Act allows FISA to be used for 
‘a significant purpose,’ rather than the primary purpose, of obtaining 
foreign intelligence information.”132  Thus, it allows FISA to be used 
primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a significant foreign 
intelligence purpose remains.133  These 2002 Protocols stated that “[t]he 
Criminal Division and OIPR shall have access to all information developed 
in full field [Foreign Intelligence (FI)] and [Foreign Counterintelligence 
(FCI)] investigations.”134  In general “[t]he FBI, the Criminal Division, and 
OIPR shall consult with one another concerning full field FI and FCI 
investigations” and “[t]he FBI, the Criminal Division, and OIPR shall meet 
regularly to conduct consultations.”135  Criminal prosecution and foreign 
intelligence gathering were melded under the amended FISA, which 
allowed prosecutors to take advantage of the more deferential warrant 
standards when conducting investigations.136
The FISA Review Court upheld Ashcroft’s protocols and the 
significant purpose standard later that year.
 
137  That court held that the 
significant purpose test satisfies the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment.138  In its decision, the court specifically stated that under this 






131 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States (Mar. 6, 
2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html [hereinafter 2002 
Protocols]. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2000)). 
134 Id.  
135 Id. 
136 Blum, supra note 92, at 282–83. 
137 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
138 Id. at 737. 
139 Id. at 735 (holding the intelligence interest must only be “measurable”). 
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While other federal courts are split,140 if the significant purpose test is 
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court,141
2. CIPA and “Classified” Evidence 
 there will be profound 
consequences for criminal prosecutions utilizing FISA evidence.  Most 
pressing for terrorism prosecution is that while the significant purpose test 
makes it easier for the government to collect information, it may 
simultaneously make it more difficult to later introduce this evidence at 
trial. 
In addition to providing alternative means for gathering foreign 
intelligence information, the federal government has created alternative 
means for introducing that evidence at trial.142  The challenge is that the 
same government interests that motivate a separate standard for gathering 
information under FISA also compel the government to keep collected 
information secret.  The struggle over how and when to allow defendants 
access to classified information is not a new problem, and Congress has 
already provided the government an alternative to producing classified 
evidence at trial.143
Historically, prosecutors were often put in a difficult position when a 
court determined that classified information needed to be disclosed.  





140 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 92, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the 
significant purpose test accepted by the FISA Review Court, but declining to consider the 
constitutionality in the immediate case); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 333 n.6 
(4th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the new standard but applying the pre-PATRIOT Act 
standard); United States v. Warsame, 547 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996–97 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(expressing concern with the constitutionality of the significant purpose test); Mayfield v. 
United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 2007) (declining to adopt FISA Review 
Court’s logic).  But cf. United States v. Ning Wen, 477 F.3d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that “significant purpose” does not offend the Fourth Amendment); United States v. 
Abu-Jihaad, 531 F. Supp. 2d 299, 308 n.9 (D. Conn. 2008) (adopting the significant purpose 
test); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of FISA, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. 
Rev. 2008) (reiterating the court’s previous holding in favor of significant purpose).  
  This lead to a practice called “graymail” where 
141 Upholding the significant purpose test would be consistent with the Court’s recent 
decisions adopting ever-larger exceptions to the Fourth Amendment.  See Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule did not 
apply to police recordkeeping mistakes); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) 
(“[Exclusion] has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 11–12 (1995) (articulating the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule). 
142 See infra note 152. 
143 See 18 U.S.C. app. 3, § 6 (2006). 
144 McEvoy, supra note 16, at 405. 
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defendants would request classified information, on the hope that the court 
would grant their request and the prosecution would decide to drop the 
case.145
In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA).
 
146  In essence, CIPA increased the relevance threshold that 
defendants must meet in order to introduce classified information.147  
Unlike regular evidence, which must simply be relevant, CIPA requires 
classified information to be highly relevant or material.148
Either party may initiate CIPA proceedings before trial.
 
149  If the 
defense wants to introduce classified information, the prosecutor may 
challenge this by filing a motion with the judge.150  The motion itself 
remains confidential, and the judge must decide if the information is 
discoverable.151  If she does, however, the prosecution must produce either 
the evidence requested or an adequate substitute.152  Pursuant to CIPA, 
prosecutors may provide defendants affidavits summarizing classified 
information in lieu of those defendants subpoenaing actual testimony.153  
The adequacy of substitute information is dependent upon the facts of the 
case.154
The Fourth Circuit debated the precise nature of an adequate substitute 





  Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in 2001 
for immigration violations, but six additional charges were later added 
146 Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006)). 
147 McEvoy, supra note 16, at 400–01; see also 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6.  
148 McEvoy, supra note 16, at 400–01.  Defendants must also alert the prosecution as to 
any classified information they intend to introduce at trial.  Id. 
149 Id. at 406. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 406–07 (stating that the defendant is not entitled to view the motion). 
152 18 U.S.C. § 6(c) provides:  
(1) Upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of specific classified 
information under the procedures established by this section, the United States may move that, in 
lieu of the disclosure of such specific classified information, the court order—(A) the 
substitution for such classified information of a statement admitting relevant facts that the 
specific classified information would tend to prove; or (B) the substitution for such classified 
information of a summary of the specific classified information. 
153 Id. 
154 See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 157–58 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming the 
trial court’s rejection of proposed substitutions that failed to inform the jury of facts deemed 
essential to the defendant’s argument).  A defendant has more than a basic right to present 
evidence material to his defense; substituted information must go beyond the bare facts of 
the case and allow the jury to understand the relevant context in which those facts are 
situated.  Id. at 158. 
155 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), aff’g on reh’g 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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relating to his purported involvement in the September 11 attacks.156  At 
trial, Moussaoui sought to introduce the testimony of individuals being held 
at Guantanamo Bay.157  The trial court determined that substituted evidence 
must not “materially disadvantage the defendant.”158  The trial court denied 
Moussaoui’s request for classified documents, but allowed him to depose 
inmates of Guantanamo Bay.159
The Fourth Circuit held that classified exculpatory evidence could be 
introduced through the CIPA summary substitution procedure but that 
inculpatory evidence could not.
 
160  The prosecutor challenged this on the 
basis of completeness.161  He argued that drawing a stark line between 
inculpatory and exculpatory statements in such an affidavit would strip it of 
its usefulness; lacking context, the information summarized therein would 
lack probative value for the jury.162  The Fourth Circuit allowed the 
inclusion of inculpatory information, provided the Government did not use 
this “as a means of seeking the admission of inculpatory statements that 
neither explain nor clarify the statements designated by Moussaoui.”163
While Moussaoui addressed a number of important issues, many still 
remain.  The case did not address the question of how CIPA could be used 
when the prosecution sought to introduce evidence in its case-in-chief.
 
164  
Additionally, the witnesses in the Moussaoui case were already in United 
States custody.165  The costs to the Executive would be higher if a 
defendant had to be given access to individual Government witnesses who 
were not in custody or not in the United States.166
Future trials of terrorism suspects will inevitably involve classified 
information and the desire to protect such information has been a central 
preoccupation of the government in resisting civil trials.
  Both issues would be 
relevant should FISA material be challenged on a Crawford basis. 
167
 
156 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457. 
 
157 Id. at 458. 
158 Id. at 477. 
159 Id. at 476. 
160 Id. at 482. 
161 Id. at 481.  The Federal Rules of Evidence state: “When a writing or recorded 
statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which 
ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.”  FED. R. EVID. 106. 
162 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 481. 
163 Id. at 482. 
164 See id. 
165 Id. at 465. 
166 See Friedman, supra note 31, at 574. 
167 See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, 
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
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III. “CONFRONTING” FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
Davis and Crawford provided a rough outline of the Court’s current 
reasoning with respect to the Confrontation Clause.  The standard for 
determining what evidence is excluded by the Clause raises potential 
problems, however, for prosecutors—specifically in the area of foreign 
intelligence. 
A. FISA, CIPA, AND APPLYING THE NEW CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Both FISA and Davis couch their respective analyses in the context of 
intent of the government agent in collecting information.168
The first question is whether foreign intelligence information can be 
considered “testimonial.”  To answer this, one must have a clear definition 
of “testimony.”  As was noted above, the Court has been vague in its 
description of the standard, particularly given the attack it leveled against 
Roberts.  The Court tells us, however, that a statement made to police 
during an interrogation is clearly testimonial because the objective declarant 
would understand that this statement would be used at trial.
  When that 
intention is criminal prosecution, however, the exclusionary consequences 
of Davis implicate the admissibility of evidence collected pursuant to FISA 
and presented under CIPA. 
169  According to 
the Court, such accusations are precisely the type of evidence the Framers 
feared based upon a historical record of executive misuse of such 
statements.170  The evidence in Crawford is of a type that falls within the 
core or “nucleus” of the Clause.171  The objective circumstances of the 
interrogation made it apparent to the declarant that her statements could be 
used at trial.172
 
1407, 1413–14 (quoting Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 at § 1(f) (Nov. 16, 
2001)) (“[I]t is not practicable to apply . . . the principles of law and [the] rules of evidence 
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”); see 
also Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the 
United States, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 135, 150 (2008) (stating that the entire trial process 
under the Bush Administration was tainted by politics). 
  But while government interrogations may be the “easy 
case” under this new standard, they are clearly not the only situation in 
which “testimonial” evidence may be generated. 
168 See supra Part II. 
169 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52–53 (2004). 
170 Id. at 47–50. 
171 Id. at 51–52. 
172 The declarant in this case was under arrest at the time she gave her statement, and had 
been given a Miranda warning.  Id. at 38.  She was under actual (rather than constructive) 
notice, therefore, that her statements could be used later at trial.   
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When required to elaborate beyond this core class of statements, the 
Court shifted the focus of its analysis from one that exclusively addressed 
the intent of the declarant173 to one that considered more objective 
factors.174  Specifically, the Court looked at the purpose of the government 
questioning.175  Unlike Crawford, where the interrogation was removed 
both geographically and temporally from the events at issue, the statements 
at issue in Davis were made in the context of “ongoing emergencies.”176  
The Court was forced to recognize that the police gather information from 
the public for more reasons than simply prosecuting criminals.177  Under 
ongoing emergency circumstances, statements elicited by the police would 
not be testimonial because they were not made to “establish or prove some 
past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police 
assistance.”178
In explaining its position, the Davis Court highlighted three factors 
which distinguish statements made to a 911 operator during an ongoing 
emergency with those made to police officers conducting an interview: 
(1) the time period in which the statement was made,
  Therefore, depending upon the surrounding circumstances, 
the intentions of both the individuals making the statements and the officers 
collecting them may change.  Depending upon the extent of that change, the 
Confrontation Clause implications of the statements may fluctuate as well. 
Both are therefore relevant. 
179 (2) the purpose of 
the questioning,180 and (3) the formality of the statement.181
 
173 Id. at 51 (defining testimony as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact”) (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).  
  Interestingly, 
wedged in between the two objective factors evidencing the physical 
context in which the statement was made, the Court introduced to the 
analysis the subjective intent of the officer.  Depending upon the purpose of 
the officers, the statements or information they elicit may or may not 
174 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[Statements] are testimonial when 
the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution.”). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 822, 827. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 827 (internal quotations omitted). 
179 Specifically: was the statement contemporaneous to the events it describes?  Id. 
180 The Court asks rhetorically whether objectively the situation was an ongoing 
emergency and whether the purpose motivating the officers to elicit the statement was 
resolution of that emergency.  Id. 
181 Id.  The statement at issue in Crawford was made “calmly,” “at the station house,” 
and was taped.  Id.  The statement in Davis was frantic, on the phone, and in “an 
environment that was not tranquil.”  Id. 
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qualify as “testimony.”182  And in describing an officer’s intent, sufficient 
to implicate the “testimonial evidence” standard, the Court specifically 
refers to “primary purpose.”183
Therefore, under Crawford and its progeny, the intent of both the 
government and the declarant are relevant to the testimonial analysis.
 
184
While the Court in Davis clearly endorsed an objective, intent-of-the-
investigation inquiry to determine the “primary purpose” of the government 
agent’s behavior, some federal and state courts have disregarded this and 
focused only on the more objective factors: context and formality.
  
Granted, intent is not the only factor, and the way in which all the relevant 
factors interact has not been conclusively shown.  In the “simple cases” of 
direct police interrogation, the officer’s intention makes the consequences 
of the statement obvious to the declarant: officer intention is clear and a 
reasonable adult will know that the statements they make might be used 
against a defendant at trial.  Alternatively, in certain “non-core” situations, 
officer intent may nevertheless be determinative. 
185  
Specifically, several circuits have also looked at the issue of how wiretap 
evidence fits into the new scheme.186  One decision, a year after Crawford, 
indicated that certain statements captured via wiretap do not constitute 
testimonial evidence.187  The Third Circuit in United States v. Hendricks 
held that statements recorded on a wiretap between co-conspirators were 
not “testimony” because they failed the “formality” test discussed in 
Crawford.188
 
182 Id. at 822; Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“In addition to the 
circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the statements and actions of both the declarant 
and interrogators provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation.”). 
  While this holding came before the decision in Davis, later 
183  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).  
184 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Pilar G. Kraman, Divining the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Intent: Applying Crawford and Davis to Multipurpose Interrogations 
by Non-Law Enforcement Personnel, 23 CRIM. JUST. 30, 33 (2009) (“In Crawford, the 
Supreme Court focused on the objective view of the declarant; and in Davis the Court 
created the so-called primary purpose test that focused on the interrogator.”); see also Davis, 
547 U.S. at 822. 
185 See generally United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The 
proper inquiry . . . is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused.”). 
186 See, e.g., United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that written approval of a wiretap authorization was admissible under Crawford); United 
States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that a wiretapped 
discussion between co-conspirators was not excluded under Crawford); United States v. 
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that co-conspirator statements 
from a wiretap were admissible under Roberts and Crawford). 
187 Hendricks, 395 F.3d at 183–84. 
188 See id. at 181.  A witness “who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does 
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courts also focused on the “formality” element when evaluating the 
admissibility of recorded statements between co-conspirators.189




Our holding refers to interrogations because . . . the statements in the cases presently 
before us are the products of interrogations—which in some circumstances tend to 
generate testimonial responses.  This is not to imply, however, that statements made in 
the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.  The Framers were no 
more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to 
open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.
  Like in Crawford, the holding in Davis focused on 
interrogations.  The Court indicated, however, that the scope of the new test 
might incorporate statements generated in other circumstances as well: 
191
Specifically responding to the attempt by Justice Thomas in his 
concurring opinion to classify testimonial evidence based upon formality, 
the Court questioned whether such a test is “workable.”
 
192
The Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts drew on this dicta and 
held that formal interrogation (or any government questioning whatsoever) 
is not required under the Confrontation Clause to produce testimony.  In 
Melendez-Diaz, the Court analyzed a challenge to a chemical analysis 
report and affidavit completed by a lab technician in a narcotics case.
 
193  
When arresting the defendant, police discovered several small plastic bags 
containing a fine white power.194
 
not.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.  The Title III recordings here at issue are much more similar 
to the latter than the former.  
  The powder was submitted to the 
189 United States v. Valle-Martinez, 336 F. App’x 720, 724 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] 
question posed by the other speaker was not ‘testimonial.’”); United States v. Fleming, F. 
App’x 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2008) (determining that video tapes of defendant meeting with 
confidential informant did not qualify as testimonial because they were not “solemn 
declarations”); United States v. Davis, 270 F. App’x 236, 248 n.9 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
statements by a confidential informant on a wiretap, not introduced for truth of the matter 
asserted, were non-testimonial); see also United States v. Emmanuel 565 F.3d 1324, 1333 
(11th Cir. 2009) (holding that a Crawford challenge to wiretap authorization was not 
preserved for trial). 
190 Friedman, supra note 31, at 567 (“A statement is not rendered non-testimonial by the 
absence of formalities . . . .  A rule that only formal statements will be characterized as 
testimonial is . . . theoretically backwards.”). 
191 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822–23 n.1 (2006).  In addition, the majority 
opinion casts doubt on the position that “formality” and “solemn” declaration are 
interchangeable.  Id. at 830–31 n.5. 
192 Id. at 830–31 n.5. (“The dissent, in attempting to formulate an exhaustive 
classification of its own, has not provided anything that deserves the description 
‘workable”—unless one thinks that the distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
statements . . . qualifies.”).   
193 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
194 Id. at 2530. 
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Massachusetts state crime laboratory for analysis.195  The tests determined 
the substance was cocaine.196  The technician who performed the tests did 
not testify at trial, but did provide a “certificate of analysis” describing the 
weight of the bags, the tests performed and the results.197  The defendant 
was found guilty.198  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the verdict, 
holding that such reports are inadmissible.199
The certificate at issue in that case was prepared specifically for use at 
the petitioner’s trial.  This type of government-prepared evidence is 
analogous to the statement of Lord Cobham introduced against Sir. Walter 
Raleigh.
 
200  For the same reasons the Court highlights in Crawford, the 
certificate is inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause.201
The utility of focusing too much on objective factors indicating 
declarant intent breaks down, however, if the declarant cannot be 
reasonably expected to understand how those factors impact the 
consequences of their statements.  For example, this problem is obvious in 
the context of child witnesses.
  This case, 
however, did not fully resolve the distinction between the subjective intent 
of the declarant and the objective intent of the interrogation. 
202  The Supreme Court of Oregon held in 
State v. Mack that the statements made by a three-year-old witness about 
alleged sexual abuse fell within the core class of testimonial hearsay 
excluded under Crawford.203  In determining that the statements were 
testimonial, however, the court did not evaluate them based upon declarant 
intent.204  A declarant-centric test would result in admission of evidence 
that “would offend” Crawford’s rigid standards.205  In this case, rather, the 
testimony was deemed testimonial as the child’s statements were elicited by 
a caseworker at the behest of police officers.206
 
195 Id. 
  The officers’ intent, not the 
declarant’s, was determinative.  Oregon is not alone; other states have 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 2531. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 2532. 
200 Id. at 2535. 
201 Id. 
202 Kraman, supra note 184, at 32 (noting that various state courts do not look at 
declarant intent in the context of children and that this result makes sense if the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to collect evidence for trial). 
203 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004). 
204 Id. 
205 Kraman, supra note 184. 
206 Mack, 101 P.3d at 353. 
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followed suit by utilizing an analysis that evaluates the subjective intent of 
the investigators, not only the subjective awareness of the declarant.207
Assuming that objective factors like formality are not determinative in 
judging “testimonial” evidence, the CIPA and the 2002 Protocols for FISA 
may raise significant confrontation problems. 
 
A showing of primary purpose is the thread that connects the Fourth 
and Sixth Amendments in this case.  In both Supreme Court Confrontation 
Clause cases after Crawford, the Court articulated the Clause’s overarching 
aim of excluding ex parte testimonial evidence generated by the 
government.208  The Court takes the position that the testimonial standard 
has a broad reach.209  By inquiring into the officers’ intention in eliciting 
statements in Davis, the Court opened the testimonial standard to 
encompass both freely given, and possibly surreptitiously recorded, 
statements.210  The holdings in both Davis and Crawford only address 
actual police interrogation.  Advances in technology since the trial of 
Walter Raleigh have made the government less dependent upon the 
interrogations of witnesses, but the danger of government abuse remains the 
same.  There is no apparent reason why evidence collected through wiretaps 
or physical searches could not be deemed testimonial if it satisfies the 
Crawford and Davis criteria.211
Let us therefore turn to the statutes themselves.  The Court in Davis 
indicated that the primary purpose of an interrogation was relevant in 
deciding whether a statement was testimonial.
 
212  If that purpose is criminal 
prosecution, the statement may be found testimonial, and therefore 
barred.213  FISA has become a powerful law enforcement tool, and one in 
which the government has shown great interest.214
 
207 See People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 357 (Ill. 2007); People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 
216 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1023 (2007); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 924–26 
(Colo. 2006). 
  Under the more lax 
208 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006). 
209 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. 
210 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.   
211 Justice Scalia specifically notes in Davis that statements made in the absence of 
interrogation can be testimonial and therefore excluded under the Confrontation Clause.  Id. 
at 822–23 n.1. 
212 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding that when the circumstances indicate that the primary 
purpose of government action is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
future prosecution, the statements made are testimonial); see also Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 359 
(noting the Davis Court’s focus on the intent of the police-questioner).  
213 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
214 Since 2002, the number of FISA applications has almost doubled.  In 2002, the 
government applied for, and was granted, 1228 FISA warrants.  In 2007 the government 
applied for 2371 and received 2370.  This is a 93% increase.  Electronic Privacy Information 
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standards for FISA warrants in the wake of September 11, the FBI may 
utilize FISA in instances where criminal prosecution is the primary purpose 
of the investigation, so long as foreign intelligence gathering is a significant 
purpose.215  Given the DOJ’s new protocols, involvement by prosecutors is 
encouraged during FISA investigations.216
It should be noted that both the Supreme Court and the lower courts 
have said the testimonial standard does not reach statements made in the 
furtherance of a conspiracy.
 
217  This would seem to carve out a chunk of the 
information collected through FISA wiretaps.  But it does not exempt 
wiretaps in general.  If the Court is serious about tying the Confrontation 
Clause to its seventeenth-century common law roots, a blanket prohibition 
on all wiretap evidence seems unlikely.  Even though the Court bases its 
definition on the common law understanding of testimony growing out of 
the Raleigh trial, logical consistency demands at least some attention be 
paid to the advances of technology in the last two hundred and fifty years.  
As Justice Brandeis pointed out in Olmstead, technology provides the 
government with means of gathering information more subtle than direct 
interrogation.218  In Raleigh’s day, collecting evidence was largely limited 
to face-to-face statements.219
The Court itself has hinted at this more expansive reading.  In 
Crawford, the majority took issue with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence, which attempted to insulate existing hearsay exceptions such 
as the co-conspirator exception, from augmentation.  Justice Scalia notes: 
  Now the government has far more subtle 
means of gathering information about its citizenry. 
Involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye 
toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time 
and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.  This 
consideration does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall within some broad, 
modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in other 
circumstances.220
Whether an accusatory statement is made to a police officer or to 
another person on a tapped phone line, the result is the same: the 
 
 
Center, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1879–2009, (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html. 
215 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(6)(B), 1823(a)(6)(B) (2006). 
216 2002 Protocols, supra note 131. 
217 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004). 
218 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
219 Intelligence gathering was limited to eavesdropping, which at the time literally meant 
standing outside a home and listening.  5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 45 (J.A. Simpson & 
E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989) (defining eavesdrop: “To stand within the ‘eavesdrop’ of a 
house in order to listen to secrets.”).   
220 Crawford, 547 U.S. at 56 n.7; see also id. at 73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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government has collected information, useful for subsequent prosecution, to 
which it otherwise would not be privy.  Given this, it seems apparent that 
the purpose of a wiretap is relevant to the issue of whether the statements 
gathered through its use are admissible under Davis and Crawford.  
Unfortunately, under this new testimonial standard, this evidence would be 
excluded regardless of its reliability. 
Like evidence generated through FISA warrants, evidence introduced 
through CIPA procedures may be barred under the Confrontation Clause.  
In Melendez-Diaz, the Court held that lab reports were barred under 
Crawford.221  In the foreign intelligence context, the most analogous 
document to the lab reports excluded in Melendez-Diaz is the substitute 
evidence provided by the government under CIPA.  In that context, the 
Court extended the bounds of excluded testimonial evidence past mere 
perception witnesses.222  By crossing this barrier, the Court nullified many 
of the policy arguments that might support an exception for CIPA.  The 
voluntariness of a CIPA substitution, the relative contemporaneous nature 
of its recording, and the fact that it does not (itself) make a direct criminal 
accusation, are all irrelevant to the determination of its admissibility.223  
Moreover, under the historic examples of governmental abuses drawn by 
the Court in its prior holdings, the affidavits at issue in Melendez-Diaz were 
significantly more innocuous than substitute evidence under CIPA,224
B. THE COSTS OF CONFRONTATION 
 and 
arguably more damning than wiretap information gleaned from FISA 
warrants. 
The federal government has significant powers to prosecute 
international terrorism, and in the past decade it has had cause for 
exercising those powers.225
 
221 See infra section III.B.1. 
  Should Crawford’s testimonial exclusion apply 
222 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2009) (holding that it does 
not matter if the statement is not “conventional” or of a type typically considered by the 
Court in the context of Confrontation). 
223 See id. 
224 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (stating ex parte examination of the sort used at Raleigh’s 
trial have “long been thought a paradigmatic confrontation violation.”).  
225 Under federal law, individuals can be prosecuted for terrorist acts committed both on 
United States soil as well as abroad.  Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, 
and the Preventative Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 677–78 (2009) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2332b(a), (c) (2006)).  The federal government can charge an individual for murder 
of a U.S. national committed on U.S. soil upon issuance of a certificate by the Attorney 
General.  18 U.S.C. § 2332(d) (2006).  This presents the problem of trying cases where the 
scene of the crime and witnesses might be located thousands of miles away from the 
courthouse. 
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to evidence either collected under FISA’s warrants or introduced through 
CIPA, however, the result would complicate the already challenging task 
facing federal prosecutors.226  Excluding evidence gathered under FISA’s 
new permissive standard would mitigate some of the risks associated with 
allowing criminal investigation under the aegis of intelligence gathering.227
1. Melendez-Diaz: Costs Begin to Come into Focus 
  
In the context of domestic prosecutions, the benefits of such exclusion 
might outweigh the cost.  On the other hand, the exclusion of evidence 
collected under FISA warrants in terrorism trials would be more 
problematic.  Additionally, finding CIPA’s substitution procedures 
unconstitutional would disrupt a necessary, if imperfect, legislative 
balancing act.  In context of both statutes, the complexity and importance of 
the competing interests demands a legislative solution that weighs the 
demands of the parties.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of when Crawford takes governmental interests into consideration 
in its new standard last spring.  The answer was a resounding “never.” 
The Court in both Davis and Crawford implies that its new rule is less 
complex and open to interpretation than the prior reasonableness standard.  
By imposing a “wooden” standard,228 the Court has attempted to clamp 
down on inappropriate judicial judgment calls.229  Yet even with this 
standard, the analysis the lower courts must undertake is no less opaque.  
And the resultant uncertainty imposes costs on both defendants and 
prosecutors.230  Unlike Roberts, where the parties shared the burden of 
uncertainties, here challenges posed by the practical applications of 
Crawford seem directed exclusively at prosecutors.231
Since the Crawford decision came down in 2004, legal scholars have 
attempted to draw attention to the potential costs this new standard would 
 
 
226 See S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 2 (1980). 
227 It certainly would not fix all the problems, however.  
228 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
229 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth 
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous 
notions of ‘reliability.’”). 
230 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545.  Writing after the Davis opinion came down, 
Richard Friedman predicts the possibility that as a consequence of the Court’s primary 
purpose language, the new standard may only impose costs on the prosecution.  Friedman, 
supra note 31, at 574–75 (noting that there are situations where a court may deem evidence 
testimonial, but the expense of providing a live witness is exorbitant and the accused seems 
to have no plausible expectation that confrontation would do him any good) (citing Metzger, 
supra note 8)). 
231 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2545. 
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impose.232  The first practical question to be taken up by the Court was 
decided in June 2009.233  The Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts was 
asked to determine whether the costs to the government could be considered 
under its new standard.234  The Court responded “no” and emphasized that 
the burden of its new standard lay squarely at the prosecutor’s feet.235  
“[T]he Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to 
present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses 
to court.”236
The majority in Melendez-Diaz commented on how the question of lab 
reports/affidavits called for a “straightforward” application of the 
testimonial standard from Crawford.
 
237  While the declarant in Crawford 
was determined to have been objectively aware that her words could be 
used later at trial, the statements contained in the report and affidavit at 
issue in Melendez-Diaz were made with the actual intent that they be 
introduced at trial.238
The prosecution put forward four arguments attempting to distinguish 
the declarant in this case from other types of perception witnesses.
 
239  They 
argued that the technician is not an “accusatory” witness or one who 
directly accuses the defendant of wrongdoing.240  They argued that the 
technician is not “conventional” in that they did not observe the facts salient 
to the crime.241  They asserted that because the statements were not elicited 
through interrogation they fall outside of the Crawford/Davis rule.242
 
232 Some of the cost issues which have thus far been raised include those related to child 
testimony and testimony in domestic abuse cases.  See Kimberly Y. Chin, “Minute and 
Separate”: Considering the Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases After Crawford and Davis, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 71 (2010); G. 
Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 43 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 35, 80–81 (2009).  Battered women and abused children are frequently 
the only witnesses to the crimes perpetrated on them, but are often unable or unwilling to 
testify.  See Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 315, 327 (2009).  In such instances, a rigid confrontation rule would bar charges 
from being brought.  Id. 
  And 
finally, they pointed out that the witness is not recounting historic facts 
233 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2527. 
234 Id. at 2540. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 2532–33. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 2533. 
241 Id. at 2535. 
242 Id. 
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“prone to distortion” but rather reporting scientific fact, the “result of 
neutral, scientific testing.”243
The Court, however, held that none of these factors are relevant to its 
Confrontation Clause analysis.  It may be true, the majority noted, “that 
there are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or 
verify the results of a forensic test.  But the Constitution guarantees one 
way: confrontation.  We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation 
Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.”
 
244
2. Costs Specific to Terrorism Trials
 
245
Given its responsibilities enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, the 
Executive has certain recognized interests in collecting foreign 
intelligence.
 
246  The Executive also has the responsibility to prosecute 
suspected criminals.247  These interests can coincide, and when they do, the 
competing interests of fair trial and information control need to be 
reconciled.  In the context of international terrorism prosecutions, one 
particular problem is the government’s limited ability to compel appearance 
of potentially relevant witnesses.248
 
243 Id. at 2536 (internal quotations omitted).  The State also pointed out that the 
documents are akin to business records admissible at common law.  Id. at 2538. 
  The general solution to this problem 
has been the hearsay exceptions articulated in the Federal Rules of 
244 Id. at 2536. 
245 For a discussion of some of the costs specific to terrorism trials, see Chesney, supra 
note 225, at 705 (noting that while there are few examples of terrorism trials being derailed 
due to adverse evidentiary rulings, what is unclear is the extent to which individuals are not 
being criminally prosecuted because of procedural evidentiary hurdles); see generally S. REP. 
NO. 96-823 (1980).  
246 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 n.26 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“The Government is charged not only with the task of bringing wrongdoers 
to justice, but also with the grave responsibility of protecting the lives of the citizenry.”). 
247 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . .”); see also United States v. Sitka, 666 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Conn. 
1987) (“This duty to execute the laws is a broad power not specifically limited to powers 
enumerated in the text of the Constitution.”). 
248 In the United States, defendants have the right to secure the attendance of witnesses 
on the issuance of a subpoena by the courts.  United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. 341 (1800) 
(Opinion of Chase, J.).  Under federal law, a court can issue a subpoena on an individual 
living outside of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2006), see also Blackmer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (upholding a statute under which a U.S. national living abroad 
was held in contempt for failing to comply with a subpoena issued by a federal court).  That 
being said, the Court in Blackmer stated that its holding was based upon its in personum 
jurisdiction over the defendant.  Id. at 438.  While federal courts now analyze the issue 
through the lens of “minimum contacts,” the consequence remains the same: non-citizen 
witnesses living abroad are not necessarily subject to federal process.  See Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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Evidence.249  In the context of foreign intelligence, specifically, Congress 
has created a flexible regulatory scheme designed to address the competing 
interests through evidentiary substitution.250
Since the government amended the FISA standards in 2001, evidence 
gathered pursuant to these warrants has played an increasingly significant 
role at trial.
 
251  Terrorism trials tend to involve a great deal of electronic 
surveillance.252  In one case from 2003, United States v. Al-Arian, the 
evidence at trial included 21,000 hours of telephone recordings collected 
under FISA.253  The evidence in another case from 2004, United States v. 
Hassoun, included 275 transcripts of recorded conversations and over 300 
summaries of those intercepts, whittled down from 10,000 to 12,000 pages 
of materials.254  In a third case, United States v. Sattar, the Government 
made extensive disclosures prior to trial including 85,000 audio recordings, 
written summaries of 5,300 voice calls, and 10,000 pages of e-mails.255
The ability to collect and store vast quantities of information has not 
made the process of analyzing that information any less costly.  This is a 
challenge not just for the federal government during terrorism trials but for 
civil discovery procedures in general.
 
256
Moreover, the challenges of having individuals testify to such 
voluminous information assumes that the Government even has access to 
the declarants who are recorded on the relevant tapes.  Should the courts 
determine that the significant purpose standard for FISA warrants triggers 
the “testimonial” exclusion at trial, terrorism trials in Article III courts will 
require the production of all the individuals making statement on these 
tapes.  This is a difficult prospect.  FISA warrants cover conversations 
  Mandating that individuals testify 
as to the contents of thousands of hours of recorded phone conversations—
when the contents of those conversations bear adequate indicia of reliability 
on their own–would be a waste of the court’s time. 
 
249 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 107 (arguing that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
have largely been up to the task in the context of terrorism trials). 
250 Id. at 85. 
251 See infra note 253. 
252 Id. 
253 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2003).  The defendant in this case was 
prosecuted for allegedly providing material support to Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a militia 
organization in Palestine.  Id. 
254 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 78 (citing Protective Order, United States v. 
Hassoun, No. 04-cr-60001 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2004) (Dkt. No. 34)). 
255 No. 02 CR. 395 JGK, 2003 WL 22137012, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2003).   
256 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91; see also Robert W. Trenchard, Two Roads 
Diverge in Managing E-Discovery Costs, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 2009, at S6.  
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between individuals in the United States and elsewhere.257  Locating and 
transporting such individuals to domestic courts may prove impossible.258
In addition to the admissibility of FISA evidence generally, an 
overlapping issue is the procedure for admitting classified information.  
Congress passed CIPA in order to balance the interests of prosecution and 
defense specifically in the context of classified evidence.
 
259  The issues 
raised in Moussaoui have yet to reach the Supreme Court, but on its face, 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision raises significant Crawford questions.  While 
ostensibly situating its holding under the new testimonial standard, the 
Fourth Circuit in Moussaoui fell back on a balancing standard reminiscent 
of Roberts.260  Despite the fact that the evidence was being used to 
contextualize other exculpatory evidence, the court allowed introduction of 
inculpatory evidence against the defendant by means of government 
affidavit.261
The challenge that classified information poses for trial practice is as 
great as the interests at stake are significant.
  Under all three Supreme Court decisions describing the 
testimonial rule, such an affidavit would be inadmissible.  Plus, any 




257 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006). 
  Since its passage in 1980, 
258 There are a number of strategies which have been utilized by courts attempting to 
mitigate the challenges associated with in person testimony.  Zabel and Benjamin provide a 
comprehensive description of many of the steps taken by courts to accommodate these 
unique challenges.  ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 109; see United States v. Ressam 
593 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing pre-Crawford trial verdict against petitioner 
after court had allowed the deposition of a witness living outside the United States to be 
introduced as evidence at trial); United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1312–18 (11th Cir. 
2006) (allowing video conferencing of witness unable to participate at trial).  In Yates, the 
court noted Justice Scalia’s objection to this type of evidence on confrontation grounds.  Id. 
at 1314–15. 
259 Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) 
(codified in 18 U.S.C. app 3 (2006)); S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 3 (1980) (“The purpose of this 
bill is to help ensure that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law and to help 
strengthen the enforcement of laws designed to protect both national security and civil 
liberties.  Too often the duty of the government to protect legitimate national security secrets 
and to prosecute lawbreakers have been in conflict.  Insofar as possible, [this bill] resolves 
that conflict.”). 
260 United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 468 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Moussaoui . . . has a 
Sixth Amendment right to [detainees’] testimony . . . [but] this right must be balanced 
against the Government’s legitimate interest in preventing disruption [Redacted] of the 
enemy combatant witnesses.”).  
261 Id. at 482.  
262 Chesney, supra note 225, at 708 (“[W]hile it may be possible [to present declarants at 
trial] in many instances . . . presumably it will not be possible in some non-trivial number of 
cases.”). 
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courts have upheld the constitutionality of CIPA procedures.263  Starting in 
the 1980s, it has been heavily relied upon in terrorism cases.264  It has found 
success precisely because it is a flexible standard, capable of adapting to the 
ever-changing prosecutorial environment.265  The Supreme Court, however, 
has been explicit in its rejection of any flexibility or balancing of interests 
in the context of Confrontation.266  This contradicts the express intention of 
Congress in fashioning this statue.267  Moreover, CIPA, while not perfect, 
does function to ensure that both sides are able to put on an effective 
case.268  To remove this scheme would prompt the return of tactics such as 
“graymail,” which serve only to obstruct the trial process.269
Safeguards are needed to protect defendants’ rights at trial, and 
confrontation is a critical tool for testing the validity and reliability of 
evidence.
  
270  But the Federal Rules of Evidence have existed for thirty-five 
years,271 and have been shown to provide adequate safeguards against the 
introduction of unreliable testimony.272
Alternatively, should the Court stand pat, terrorism suspects will not 
be able to avoid prosecution by “gaming the system” by invoking their 
constitutional rights.  Rather, the government will shift the forum of 
  The Court should return to the 
Roberts reliability standard, not because it provides less protection to the 
interests of the defendant, but rather because it is more consistent with the 
aims of the Confrontation Clause itself. 
 
263 United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., No. 3:04-CR-240-G, 2007 WL 
628059, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2007); United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023 
LBS., 2001 WL 66393, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001). 
264 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 85 (citing e.g., United States v. Warsame, No. 
04-cr-00029, 2007 WL 74828, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2007); United States v. Salah, 462 F. 
Supp. 2d 915, 925 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142–43 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
265 See United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 796 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“CIPA is 
neither exhaustive nor explicitly exclusive with respect to the presentation of classified 
testimony or documents at trial.”). 
266 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009) (holding that despite 
the “burden[some]” “necessities of the trial and adversarial process” this new standard may 
entail, the Court cannot water down the rule it has articulated) (internal quotations omitted). 
267 ZABEL & BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 85 (“Congress’ express intent in enacting CIPA 
was that federal district judges . . . ‘must be relied upon to fashion creative and fair solutions 
to these problems.’”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-283 (1980)). 
268 Id. at 87 (“Prior evaluations of CIPA have found that CIPA is effective not only in 
espionage prosecutions but in terrorism prosecutions as well.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
269 See McEvoy, supra note 16, at 405. 
270 Metzger, supra note 8, at 501 (noting that each aspect of the Confrontation Clause 
serves to advance the “search for reliability”). 
271 Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub. L. No. 
93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). 
272 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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prosecution—most likely to military tribunals.273  In essence, by requiring 
that evidence collected pursuant to FISA warrants always be introduced via 
live testimony, the Court is incentivizing the use of military tribunals over 
Article III courts.  And these tribunals provide significantly fewer 
protections for detainees than they would enjoy under the return to a 
Roberts formulation.274
IV. CONCLUSION: OVERTURN CRAWFORD, REWRITE FISA, OR . . . BOTH? 
  More generally, these tribunals weaken our 
commitment to the rule of law at home while decimating the legitimacy of 
our legal system abroad. 
The Obama Administration has indicated that it believes trying 
terrorism suspects in Article III courts, with all the rights and privileges that 
such trials entail, is a worthy goal.275  This is a laudable position.  The 
demand for terrorism prosecutions will only become more frequent in the 
future.276
 
273 It is possible that the Confrontation Clause issue would not necessarily be resolved by 
restricting terrorism trials to military courts.  Justice Scalia takes great pains to justify his 
holding in Crawford on the basis of common law principles and fundamental values of the 
judicial process.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004); Dratel, supra note 
  The attempts to limit the rights of individuals accused of 
5, at 
20.  The opinion did not just rely on the meaning of confrontation in the abstract, but found 
the genesis of the right outside of the four corners of the Constitution.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
43; Dratel, supra note 5, at 20.  Therefore, it could be argued that even defendants facing 
trial before military tribunals might be able to challenge testimonial evidence.  If this were 
the case, the challenges of Crawford might be exacerbated by the Court’s holding in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  Conspiracy is not recognized as a crime under 
the law of war.  Id. at 603–04.  Should the Court not recognize a conspiracy, statements that 
might otherwise be barred under the Confrontation Clause, could now be introduced. 
274 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 
10 U.S.C. §§ 948–50 (2006)) (enacting Chapter 47A of Title 10 of the United States Code 
and amending § 2241 of Title 28).  In recent months, we are actually seeing evidence of an 
even more disturbing third alternative: targeted killings.  Karen DeYoung & Joby Warrick, 
For Obama Administration, Fatal Blows Take Precedence, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2010, at 
A1 (discussing how the difficulty of dealing with terrorism suspects captured alive has 
disincentivized their capture and trial for the U.S. government).  
275 Jerry Markon, Terror Trials in U.S. Are a Worry, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2009, at A4 
(“Obama’s nominee for Pentagon general counsel recently told a Senate committee that the 
president’s ‘predispositions’ are for civilian trials.”).  
276 Despite being a party to the drafting Rome Statute, the United States has refused to 
ratify and join the International Criminal Court (ICC).  While one might argue that crimes 
like international terrorism are best suited for an international forum like the ICC, the United 
States may be fully capable of exercising jurisdiction over terrorists committing purely 
international crimes without the ICC.  Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, any state 
has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the 
community of nations as of universal concern.  These include piracy, slave trade, aircraft 
hijacking, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps terrorism.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404.  This power is not completely unbounded, and as it has become 
more frequently utilized, there have been stronger and more frequent calls to curtail it.  Dapo 
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terrorism in the last decade by subjecting them to ad hoc military tribunals 
has resulted in only five convictions.277  Conversely, of the 449 defendants 
charged with terrorism or national security crimes in civilian courts since 
September 11, 271 have settled with 230 ending in convictions.278  
Nevertheless, despite the impotence of extrajudicial detention at 
Guantanamo Bay, a political backlash has stymied the Administration’s 
attempt to focus on prosecuting terrorists in domestic courts.279  Civilian 
courts have shown that they are capable of handling terrorism trials.280  
There have been setbacks as well.281
In November 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and four alleged accomplices would be tried in 
federal court in Manhattan.
  The challenges that Crawford poses 
could lend fuel to this particular fire. 
282  Despite an initial outpouring of support for 
this proposal, opposition soon began to build in the city against allowing 
this to go forward.283  This sentiment echoed the resistance to moving the 
suspects held at Guantanamo Bay to United States soil.  While much of the 
criticism has centered on the costs and security concerns associated with 
both the trial284 and the transfer,285 critics have been willing to critique the 
premise that accused terrorists should be afforded the right to civilian 
trial.286
 
Akande & Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign 
Domestic Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 815, 847–48 (2010).  
 
277 Clyde Haberman, Verdict Replies to Terrorists and to Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
2011, at A23.  
278 Id.  
279 Shane, supra note 3.  
280 Haberman, supra note 277. 
281 Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Indefinite Detention Possible for Suspects at 
Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2010, at A3 (describing Administration plans for 
“indefinite detention” executive order).  
282 Savage, supra note 2.  In April, the Obama Administration abandoned its plans to try 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in civilian court.  Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials 
for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at A1. 
283 Shane, supra note 3.  
284 Al Baker, Security for Terrorism Trials Estimated at $200 Million a Year, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010 at A25 (describing the costs associated with trying 9/11 suspects in 
Manhattan).  
285 Charlie Savage, U.S. to Move Detainees to Illinois, Offical Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
2009 at A26.  
286 Julie Kirtz, With New York All but Ruled Out, Lawmakers Look for Cheap, Safe Spot 
for 9/11 Trials, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 31, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
2010/01/31/new-york-ruled-lawmakers-look-cheap-safe-spot-trials (“I think we ought to 
have three criteria.  Number one, where can we try them safely?  Where can we try them 
quickly?  And where can we try them inexpensively?  I’m for whichever venue accomplishes 
those things.”) (quoting Sen. Evan Bayh) (internal quotation omitted); Charlie Savage, 
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As much as political opponents of the Obama Administration’s initial 
plan may wish the opposite to be true, military tribunals are not the best 
forum for trying international terrorists.287  Before courts are ready to take 
on trials of alleged terrorists, however, the Supreme Court needs to provide 
a more definite explanation of “testimonial” evidence.  Too many questions 
remain as to the “new” scope of the Confrontation Clause.  Terrorism 
prosecutions present unique challenges to federal prosecutors.  The Court’s 
opinion in Melendez-Diaz expressed little concern for the very real 
logistical challenges the broad testimonial rule announced in that case 
would imply.288  Requiring that individuals testify in person to all steps of 
the chain of custody would require individual custodians to spend 
significant amounts of time in court and not doing the substantive work 
they are charged with.289  Local and state government agencies are already 
understaffed, and while it may be too early to see the true impact of 
Melendez-Diaz, the decision no doubt imposes real costs on prosecutors 
which will inevitably translate into fewer legitimate cases being brought to 
trial.290
These logistical challenges are multiplied many times in the context of 
foreign intelligence.  Congress enacted CIPA because it understood that the 




Holder Defends Decision to Use U.S. Court for 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at 
A18 (describing political opposition to trying 9/11 suspects in civilian courts); Danny 
Hakim, Patterson Calls Obama Wrong On 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009 at A26 
(“[H]aving those terrorists tried so close to the attack is going to be an encumbrance on all 
New Yorkers.”) (quoting Gov. David A. Paterson).  
  The inevitable 
impact of the imposition of these costs was the inclination to pursue fewer 
287 See Haberman, supra note 277 (noting that there have been 230 convictions of 
terrorism suspects in federal civilian courts since September 11, compared with just five in 
military commissions).  
288 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2544–45 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s new Confrontation Clause standard “threatens to disrupt 
if not end many prosecutions where guilt is clear but a newly found formalism now holds 
sway”). 
289 Id. at 2544 (arguing that, since many “people play a role in a routine test for the 
presence of illegal drugs[,]” it is difficult to determine which person “is the analyst to be 
confronted under [the majority’s rule]”). 
290 Id; see generally Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its Impact and Potential 
Concerns, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 471, 474 (2007) (“[A] lack of qualified forensic scientists 
[has led] to understaffing and ultimately massive backlogs.”). 
291 S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 3 (1980) (“The Government’s understandable reluctance to 
compromise national security information invites defendants and their counsel to press for 
the release of sensitive classified information the threatened disclosure of which might force 
the government to drop the prosecution.”) (quoting Attorney General Philip Heymann). 
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criminal convictions.292
Therefore, in addition to providing a more definite definition of 
testimonial evidence, the Obama Administration and the Congress should 
abandon the significant purpose test articulated in both the PATRIOT Act 
and the 2002 Protocols.  The Supreme Court has not weighed in on this 
issue, so perhaps its dismissal of the test will force the Executive’s hand.  
But regardless, adhering to the significant purpose analysis raises practical 
problems more immediate than the potential constitutional ones.  Fostering 
a culture of information sharing within government is a positive goal, but 
the significant purpose test is not the right way to do this.  A clear 
demarcation between domestic investigations and foreign intelligence 
investigations is essential to the success of both.  There is a strong need for 
more comprehensive foreign intelligence tools, but given the risks involved, 
they cannot be conflated with existing law enforcement practices.  
Integrating the two puts the government’s ability to successfully prosecute 
offenders at risk.  This will make the government less willing to use Article 
III courts, or more willing to flout their determinations if they dismiss 
claims for evidentiary problems. 
 If the Court was to prohibit evidence collected 
through FISA warrants, and instead insist that individuals recorded under 
those warrants testify in person, similar costs would be imposed. 
A. RETHINK FISA’S PRIMARY PURPOSE STANDARD 
The most obvious solution to this problem is to repeal the PATRIOT 
Act’s augmentation of the preexisting FISA warrant standard.  If the 
Congress is serious about FISA being a foreign intelligence-gathering 
tool—rather than a criminal prosecution tool—there is no reason justifying 
this standard.  FISA already removes the obligation that the government 
demonstrate probable cause to secure a warrant—the permissive significant 
purpose standard practically removes the need for any showing at all.293
 
292 Id. at 2 (“The more sensitive the information compromised, the more difficult it 
becomes to enforce the laws that guard our national security.”) (quoting STAFF OF SENATE 
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE, 
95th CONG., REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
(Comm. Print 1978)). 
 
293 The federal district court in Mayfield v. United States held in 2007 that the new 
standard violated the Constitution as a Title III warrant was necessary whenever the primary 
purpose of an investigation is criminal prosecution.  504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1041 (D. Or. 
2007).  This decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit on the basis of standing without 
reaching the merits of the claim.  Mayfield v. United States, 588 F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
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B. RETHINK CRAWFORD 
A second priority is to overturn Crawford.  The Court, however, has 
made it clear that government interest is not a factor to consider in its new 
standard, and so policy arguments may fall on deaf ears.294
In Crawford, while the Court parses the historic record for justification 
of the new standard, it refuses to define specifically what “testimonial” 
evidence really means in the context of actual practice.
  Nevertheless, in 
addition to the specific problems raised by this standard in the context of 
foreign intelligence evidence, there are deeper structural questions about the 
justification for the Crawford standard on its own.  Specifically, it seems 
suspect that the testimonial standard has any basis in the actual 
Constitution. 
295  After thirty-two 
pages, the Court ends its opinion by acknowledging that it has not provided 
a definition of “testimonial” evidence: “We leave for another day any effort 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”296  Without such a 
definition, the utility of the testimonial test remained suspect.297  While 
courts have attempted several times to fill in this blank spot in the years 
since Crawford, uncertainty remains as to its true scope.298
 
294 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2009). 
  The Court itself 
acknowledges that the Clause could cover a variety of circumstances: ex 
295 This line of analysis may be questionable in and of itself given that questioning and 
interrogation by police officers—the subject of Crawford and Davis—was a topic that the 
common law had not dealt with in 1789.  See Bradley, supra note 232, at 322. 
296 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).  The most recent decision has 
provided some clarification by incorporating the traditional hearsay analysis into the primary 
purpose determination.  Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011).  Still, as there 
seems to be some conflict with the initial motivations of the Court when deciding Crawford, 
it appears plausible that further clarification is still warranted.  See id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[The majority opinion] is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist narrative 
in which reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence . . . .”). 
297 While addressing very different subject matter, Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the 
testimonial standard in Crawford is reminiscent of his dissent in Mistretta v. United States.  
488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989).  Both tests reject any sort of ad hoc evaluation, and focus rather 
on the “character” of the power or right at issue.  Id. at 427; Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).  Confrontation, much like delegation, is a practice that does not lend 
itself to bright-line rules.  See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72.  While it may be conceptually 
easier to impose a rigid ban on introducing ex parte testimonial evidence or delegating 
legislative powers to the courts, the practical demands of both the lawmaking and criminal 
justice systems demand a more nuanced and flexible guidebook. 
298 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (“[Holding, w]ithout attempting 
to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . . .”); see also United 
States v. Arnold 486 F.3d 177, 187 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that Crawford did not provide a 
“comprehensive definition” of the term “testimonial”); United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 
1287, 1300 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court declined to rigidly define what is meant 
by the term ‘testimonial.’”). 
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parte sworn statements such as affidavits, prior testimony, unsworn 
statements to police officers, or even in-court statements.299
The problem stems from the Court’s shaky foundation supporting the 
primacy of testimonial evidence in the Sixth Amendment.
  Without 
defining the outer bounds of testimony, application of this rule is no less 
fluid than a reliability standard and is subject to the same judicial 
uncertainty. 
300  As said above, 
the central challenge of Confrontation Clause analysis is resolving the 
tension between the facially restrictive wording of the Clause and the 
realities of a functional justice system.  The Court in Crawford implies that 
too much evidence was getting in under the Roberts standard, and therefore 
sought to impose restrictions.301
The question, however, is why the Court can focus on the “bearing of 
testimony” as the essence of what it means to be a witness.
  It seems to be able to avoid the potential 
pitfall of overextending the Clause by drawing a distinction between 
“evidence” and “testimony.”  Barring “testimonial” evidence keeps a great 
deal of problematic ex parte statements out, while not simultaneously 
imposing an unworkable rule. 
302  The concept 
of “testimony” is the keystone that links “witness”—the word that appears 
in the text of the Confrontation Clause–and the ex parte formal statements 
and affidavits the Court is trying to exclude.303  The definition that the 
Court uses is drawn from the 1828 edition of Webster’s New American 
Dictionary.304
 
299 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50–52.  The Court raises but then dismisses the last category, 
in-court statements, but does so on the basis of the historic precedent it has identified, not 
any intrinsic quality of “testimony” itself.  Id. at 50.  “[W]e once again reject the view that 
the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony . . . .  Leaving 
the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the 
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.  
Raleigh was, after all, perfectly free to confront those who read Cobham’s confession in 
court.”  Id. at 50–51. 
  Having cited only one dictionary definition, however, the 
300 Id. at 69–70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  The classification of testimonial versus 
non-testimonial evidence is arbitrary, at least with regards to the common law.  Id.  The law 
of testimony non-exclusion was fully developed at the time of the framing.  Id. at 72.  Given 
that the law of exclusion was in the midst of developing, there is no reason to suspect that 
the Framers would ascribe to such a wooden and categorical rule.  Id. at 73. 
301 Id. at 60 (holding that the Roberts test departs from historical principles because it 
admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding). 
302 This is the “logical hook” upon which the Court hangs its holding in Crawford.  
Justice Scalia asserts that the word “witness” in the Confrontation Clause should be defined 
as “one who bears testimony,” which in turn is used to justify the Court’s blanket exclusion 
of any “testimonial evidence.”  Id. at 51.  This judicial sleight-of-hand takes but five 
sentences and cites to no precedent.  Id. at 51. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
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Court significantly inflates its lexicographic choice by asserting that the 
bearing of testimony is a more formalized activity than presenting other 
types of evidence.305  Resting such an important point of the analysis on one 
dictionary definition is suspect, particularly when no reason for using that 
particular dictionary over another is given.306
Yet the fact is, one can look elsewhere in legal dictionaries from the 
period and find alternative definitions of “witness.”  For example, a legal 
dictionary from 1811 defines a witness as “[o]ne who gives evidence in a 
cause”
  The logic of the opinion is 
dependent upon accepting that the definition of “witness” is the bearer of 
“testimony,” rather than a more general (but no less plausible) definition of 
“witness,” such as one who bears or presents “evidence.”  Should this 
definition of witnesses be accepted (rather than the more formalized “bearer 
of testimony”), it would be a much more tenuous inferential leap to 
establish the type of bright-line rule announced in Crawford. 
307 and a second from 1848 likewise defines a witness as “one who 
gives evidence in a cause.”308
This is not to say that Ohio v. Roberts was wholly unproblematic.  The 
old reliability standard lacked a unifying theory to ground its application.  It 
typically provided no more protections to defendants than the Federal Rules 
of Evidence envisioned.
  The “bearer of testimony” definition, while 
critical for sewing up the logic of the Court’s holding, seems to be only one 
of several equally plausible options. 
309  Under this standard, the Confrontation Clause 
had a limited effect.310
Imposing the rigid testimonial standard in Crawford to foreign 
intelligence might effectively bar certain terrorism trials in federal court.  
While in other contexts the costs this rigid rule creates might simply result 
in fewer cases being brought, terrorism trials present a unique situation.  
The Bush Administration’s experiment with military tribunals raises a 
possible alternative to the acquittal/dismissal decision the government 
might otherwise be faced with.  It is not entirely clear how the Crawford 
  While this is potentially a problem to address, the 
solution is not Crawford.   
 
305 Id. 
306 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2543–44 (2009) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Court’s approach has become ‘disconnected from history and 
unnecessary to prevent abuse.’  The Court’s reliance on the word ‘testimonial’ is of little 
help, of course, for that word does not appear in the text of the Clause.”) (citation omitted). 
307 6 GILES JACOB & T. E. TOMLINS, THE LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, 
PROGRESS, AND PRESENT STATE OF THE ENGLISH LAW 450 (1811). 
308 J.J.S. WHARTON, ESQ., THE LAW LEXICON, OR DICTIONARY OF JURISPRUDENCE 1070 
(1848). 
309 Bradley, supra note 232, at 318 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)). 
310 Friedman, supra note 31, at 554. 
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rule would apply to such commissions, but the “flexible” evidentiary rules 
of these tribunals would no doubt make them an attractive option to an 
overzealous administration driven by political pressures to punish terrorists.  
Nevertheless, these commissions have proven at the very least a political 
liability and at most a denial of fundamental human rights.  They are not a 
valid option, and to the extent that Crawford incentivizes their use, it should 
be overruled. 
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